Putin’s Media Coverage Suffers in Aftermath of Ukrainian Counteroffensive

Today's installment expands on last week's investigation of how Ukraine's incursion into Kursk is affecting Russians' sentiment toward Putin. Stay tuned for a quick-turn newsletter on how the Kremlin's propaganda machine is responding to the incursion.

Key points from FilterLabs’ analysis: 

• Since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, sentiment toward Russian president Vladimir Putin has been deteriorating in mainstream news media and social media across Russia. From August 6 to 16, sentiment in social media discourse related to Putin dropped more than 0.3 (on a scale of 1.0 to -1.0) in regions the Russian Ministry of Defense has targeted for recruiting contract soldiers, and almost 0.4 in regions with increased military production. 
• While the Kremlin is able to exert influence on news media coverage—which we see, for example, in the small number of Kursk-related items on the front page of Russian news web portals—additional factors such as natural disasters and economic issues almost certainly play a role in the downward trend in sentiment in mainstream Russian news.  
  • We also found that regional media is less likely than the nationwide mainstream outlets to sugarcoat news that may reflect poorly on the president. 
• In contrast, social media users directed their discontent with the incursion toward the president, calling it a failure of the government and of Putin himself.

In its newsletter last Friday, FilterLabs found that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kursk was having an effect on the Russian media ecosystem. On social media nation-wide, and in mainstream media outlets in Kursk, sentiment around Vladimir Putin fell sharply. 

In mainstream news across Russia, however, sentiment remained level. It looked like a testament to the Kremlin’s ability to control the coverage and tenor of Russian news. 

Now, as we’ve investigated further, FilterLabs is detecting a decline in sentiment around Putin in other areas of Russia as well—both on social media (which includes social media platforms, messaging apps, online forums, and news story comment sections) and in the mainstream press. 

In mainstream news sources from Moscow city, sentiment around Putin remains stable. But since the Ukrainian incursion sentiment around Putin has fallen on social media in the city:

The picture is slightly different in Moscow Oblast, the region surrounding the capital city. There were a few days of stability in mainstream news sources after the Kursk incursion, but sentiment around Putin in mainstream news sources then dropped, continuing its decline for a week:

Declining sentiment suggests that the media coverage is reflecting poorly on Putin, or at least associating him with unfavorable news, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to separate Putin from the military debacle. FilterLabs’ review of mainstream news coverage before and after the Ukrainian counteroffensive also revealed that, even if developments in Kursk were minimally covered, concerns around economic issues—such as inflation—or natural disasters, for example, likely play a role in the downward trend in sentiment toward Putin.  

There are worrying signs for Putin elsewhere in Russia as well. For example, the Russian Ministry of Defense has named certain regions as its main targets for recruiting contract soldiers. FilterLabs looked more closely at these regions and found that social media sentiment around Putin dropped markedly in the days after the counteroffensive. 

From August 6 to 16, it dropped more than 0.3 (on a −1 to +1 scale), from 0.286 to −0.038. 

News media sentiment remained fairly steady in the immediate aftermath, but dropped slightly the following week. 

For context, consider public reaction to the Prigozhin rebellion: sentiment toward Putin dipped only slightly in news media (from 0.427 to 0.417) and actually rose in social media (from 0.128 to 0.186) during the 2023 Wagner Group uprising.

If Putin’s prestige and popularity fall in these key regions (especially if Russians feel that the war is going badly), the Kremlin may find it more difficult to fill its military ranks. Independent analysts have found that the Kremlin's recruitment strategy depends on its ability to manage public perception of the war. Media coverage of the Kursk incursion can only hamper those efforts.

Certain other regions are especially important for their role in military-related production. In these areas, sentiment around Putin fell by 0.365 on social media in the ten days after the start of the counteroffensive—from 0.570 to 0.203. It has dropped even further since then. 

It also dropped for a period, though less rapidly, in mainstream news:

There are also signs of trouble along the Ukrainian border. Sentiment in content mentioning Putin dipped in mainstream news coverage in Belgorod Oblast, which is due south of Kursk:

FilterLabs found a similar decline in sentiment around Putin in mainstream media sources from the oblasts of Kursk and Bryansk (just northwest of Kursk):

The same was true in mainstream media in another border region, Rostov Oblast. Sentiment around Putin declined:

In sum, sentiment around Putin is falling in key areas around Russia. This development suggests a few potential implications. First, the Russian government can control the tenor of national coverage and mainstream news in Moscow itself. But outside of the national news and capital city, controlling the downward trend of sentiment in news outlets is a more difficult matter amid economic and other challenges. 

Second, as we observed in last week’s newsletter, while most mainstream news outlets voice no criticism of the president even when they must mention him in conjunction with bad news, many social media users are directing their discontent with the incursion toward Putin, calling it a failure of the government and of Putin himself. Putin’s response to the incursion—although spun positively in the mainstream news—is seen as inadequate at best and insulting at worst. Our review of regional news coverage also revealed that, compared to national outlets, regional media is less likely to sugarcoat news that is likely to be perceived as negative by their audiences. 

Third, reality matters. It is hard to say how consequential the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be, but it is undoubtedly shocking and, for Putin, embarrassing. Propaganda and spin can only do so much in the face of bad news.