Has the Ukrainian counteroffensive into Kursk dented Putin’s popularity in Russia?

Vladimir’s Putin’s domestic popularity rests on his image as a strong leader who can ensure order. The Ukrainian military’s surprise incursion into the Kursk region has taken 1000 km of Russian territory, and it may be taking a bit of Putin’s prestige, too.

Using sentiment analysis and Talisman, our data platform, FilterLabs has been tracking narratives about the invasion. The invasion is a major story in the Russian mainstream media, but overall sentiment in news stories that mention Putin has remained stable:

Articles about the Ukrainian offensive have emphasized that the national government is sending economic and military aid. Putin has “promised people from Kursk” that he will “deal with the situation.” Indeed, the Kremlin has pledged to open 2,500 temporary residences for displaced persons and to devote 1.8 billion rubles for resettlement, mostly in the form of one-time, ten-thousand-ruble payments.

In local coverage in Kursk, there were also stories about Putin sending federal aid. But, as the FilterLabs team looked into coverage in the region, our data analysis found that sentiment in stories that mention Putin dropped when the invasion began:

Putin called the August 6 invasion a “large-scale provocation.” The Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory corresponded with a sudden drop in sentiment—that is, an increase in average negativity among stories that mentioned the Russian president—as the mainstream Kursk press reported Russian losses along with Putin’s response. 

Because FilterLabs can isolate and analyze hyper-local data, we were able to pick up on a discrepancy in coverage between the national press and mainstream news outlets in Kursk. It is notable that sentiment around Putin dropped in the Kursk mainstream media, but not in coverage by the national press. The national press is presenting Putin in a relatively positive light: he is organizing relief efforts. The Kursk press is making less effort to sugar-coat the situation, or to keep Putin out of it. After a recent meeting of top Russian military and law enforcement officials to discuss the Kursk situation, one news outlet asked, “Putin gathered Belousov, Shoigu, Bortnikov and Gerasimov. What happened?” There was no answer. 

FilterLabs was also able to find some independent news sources in Kursk. One story was especially critical of Russia’s leadership, with the headline “Kursk Region Residents Believe That the Government Has Abandoned Them.” As the story reported, “Evacuated residents of the border areas of the Kursk region are expressing discontent and disappointment about how the situation in their home region has developed in recent months.” Local residents were critical of both the local and national government. One reason for frustration cited by the article: “There were messages in Telegram channels about the strengthening of the Ukrainian group on the border several weeks before the attack, but no real action was taken to prevent this invasion.” 

But even in Kursk’s mainstream media, in contrast to the national news scene, there were local media sources who were willing to blame the Russian government—and implicitly Putin—for the military fiasco. 

The harshest criticism, however, was on social media. Across Russia, sentiment around Putin fell noticeably at the time of the invasion:

Sentiment was already starting to fall before the August 6 invasion, due to stories on the August 1 prisoner swap (some objected to releasing “traitors of Russia” such as the opposition politician Ilya Yashin). 

But after the start of Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk, sentiment fell even further. On social media, message boards, and messaging apps, and in comment sections, Russians expressed their frustration. Some blamed the West and Zelensky, but a large number also blamed the government itself. People were upset with politicians, including Putin. Many seemed torn about where to place the blame. Was Putin to blame for the ineffectiveness of his defense cabinet? Or did responsibility lie only on the ministers themselves? 

In a dangerous turn of events for any strongman, Putin looked weak. His term for the attack (“a large-scale provocation”) especially angered those who wanted him to officially declare war on Ukraine and prosecute the war more vigorously. “You can call it whatever you want,” wrote one commentator on a news story, “people are there and they are dying.” Another angry commentator compared the reality on the ground in Kursk to the sunny reporting on the war effort overall: “On TV we are crushing the [Ukrainian slur], occupying settlements one by one, and everything is going well for us. But in reality, they are bombing the Belgorod region, they have invaded Kursk, they are bombing cities in the Russian hinterland, and terrorist attacks are happening one after another.”

In other cases, people were willing to criticize Putin personally. The following comments appeared under a story on the aid going to Kursk and the “support” Putin is providing: “Putin is a chatterbox. Everyone knows that, even the scoundrels”; “He is ruining the country”; “Why support? Real protection is needed”; and “I wish he’d shoot himself already. It’s sickening to watch.” 

Many commentators mocked the federal aid as insufficient. After all, 10,000 rubles is only a little more than $100. “Grandpa probably thinks that for ten thousand you can buy two Zhiguli or three Moskvitch,” wrote one Redditor, referring to Soviet-era automobiles. “This old fart,” groused another, “who hasn't acquired anything in his life except a GAZ-21 with a trailer inherited [another car—a reference to Putin’s official declaration of valuable property], really thinks that this is a huge amount of money? By Soviet standards, maybe.” A forum user wrote, “He started the war—it came back [to us like a boomerang]. Now the benefactor will give 10,000 rubles for the funeral—which is enough to bury in the garden, behind the fence.” While the mainstream press heralded the aid to Kursk as a quick and decisive action, forum and social media chatter generally dismissed it. 

The online social media content that FilterLabs analyzes includes a variety of social media platforms, discussion forums, and messaging apps where Russians discuss their views, and different segments of the population tend to favor different platforms. For example, OK is used primarily by older people, who tend—on average—to hold more supportive views of Putin and the government. As we examined the artifacts underlying sentiment data, though, we found that sentiment downturn showed up across the range of social platforms, with OK representing a significant portion of the negative discourse.

In sum, FilterLabs found that the Ukrainian invasion may have indeed tarnished Putin’s prestige. The mainstream national media mostly trumpeted his aid programs. But in using Talisman to collect and analyze local data from Kursk and from social media across the country, FilterLabs was able to find real frustration with the Russian government. The aid was inadequate, the military bungling, and—most dangerously for Putin—the president deserved some of the blame.